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Abstract
The need for reliably determining the identity of a per-
son is critical in a number of different domains ranging
from personal smartphones to border security; from au-
tonomous vehicles to e-voting; from tracking child vacci-
nations to preventing human trafficking; from crime scene
investigation to personalization of customer service. Bio-
metrics, which entails the use of biological attributes such
as face, fingerprints and voice for recognizing a person, is
being increasingly used in several such applications. While
biometric technology has made rapid strides over the past
decade, there are several fundamental issues that are yet to
be satisfactorily resolved. In this article, we will discuss
some of these issues and enumerate some of the exciting
challenges in this field.
1. Introduction
Biometrics refers to the automated or semi-automated
recognition of individuals based on their physical, behav-
ioral or psychophysiological traits [13]. These traits in-
clude face, fingerprints, iris (physical); gait, keyboard typ-
ing pattern, signature (behavioral); ECG, EEG, and sac-
cadic eye movement (psychophysiological). A classical
biometric system may be viewed as a pattern recognition
engine that extracts a set of discriminative features from
the input biometric data and compares this against a set of
stored “templates” in order to determine a match. Thus, a
significant number of early papers in the biometric literature
dealt with data acquisition, quality enhancement, feature
extraction, and matching. However, the study of biometrics
extends beyond pattern recognition and engages researchers
from many different fields such as computer vision, signal
processing, cognitive psychology, sensor design, forensics,
information security, physiology, genetics, human factors,
cryptography, jurisprudence, ethics, etc. Further, since a
∗Email: rossarun@cse.msu.edu. Web: http://iprobe.cse.msu.edu
978-1-7281-3640-0/19/$31.00 c©2019 IEEE
biometric system deals with the personal information of an
individual, aspects related to data privacy are also being ad-
dressed. Thus, an operational biometric system has to con-
tend with a broad gamut of problems ranging from robust
pattern recognition to provable data security/privacy in di-
verse scenarios.
The past decade has witnessed significant technical
progress in the field of biometrics [14]. This includes: (a)
incorporation of compact biometric sensors in small per-
sonal devices like smartphones; (b) deployment of biomet-
ric systems in large-scale identification and de-duplication
applications, such as India’s Unique ID program that uses
face, fingerprint and iris; (c) development of robust match-
ing techniques for various biometric modalities based on
Deep Learning; (d) investigation of previously under-
explored biometric traits (such as ECG) for use in wearable
devices; (e) methods for rapidly searching through large
biometric databases; and (f) design of countermeasures for
addressing various types of adversarial attacks against bio-
metric systems. Notwithstanding this progress, there are a
number of fundamental problems that are yet to be resolved
in the field of biometrics. In this article, we highlight a few
of these challenges and discuss the research opportunities
in the field (Figure 1).
2. Fundamental Science
Biometric recognition is based on two central tenets: dis-
tinctiveness and persistence of the biometric trait of an in-
dividual. Distinctiveness is a measure of the uniqueness of
a biometric trait to an individual and indicates how that bio-
metric trait varies across the population. Persistence, on
the other hand, is a measure of the temporal stability of the
biometric trait pertaining to an individual. Surprisingly, our
knowledge about the distinctiveness and persistence of even
the four most extensively studied biometric traits (finger-
print, face, iris and voice) is incomplete [23, 7, 32] and of-
ten relegated to anecdotal interpretation of error rates rather
than a systematic exploration of the biology of the trait [22].
Research problem 1: Designing robust models for
quantifying the uniqueness and permanence of a bio-
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Figure 1: Illustration of some research problems in the field of biometrics.
metric trait.
3. Sensor and Human-Computer Interface
Almost every biometric system either implicitly or ex-
plicitly imposes some type of constraint on the user or the
environment during data acquisition. As an example, an
iris recognition system might expect the user to position
their face in a certain way with respect to the camera; sim-
ilarly, a speaker recognition system might require the envi-
ronment to be reasonably quiet. For “ubiquitous biometric
recognition” to gain traction, such constraints have to be
surmounted in order to seamlessly recognize individuals,
i.e., the interaction between an individual and a biometric
system should be transparent. This would necessitate the
design of novel sensors, innovative human computer inter-
faces and robust data processing algorithms.
The Human-Computer Interface (HCI) – also known as
the Human-Biometric System Interface (HBSI) – is perhaps
the most significant component of the entire system (Figure
2). A poorly conceived HBSI can result in the acquisition
of poor quality data which, in turn, can exacerbate the er-
rors of the biometric matcher. It can also undermine the
usability and security of the entire system. A thoughtfully
designed HBSI, on the other hand, will not only enhance
user adoption of the technology [8] but also significantly
improve user throughput in high volume applications such
as border control systems. The HBSI will also play a piv-
otal role in procuring useful information when dealing with
non-cooperative subjects in law enforcement applications.
Human factors (and ergonomics) is a relatively understud-
ied problem in the biometrics literature.
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Figure 2: The design of the human-computer interface of a
biometric system plays a crucial role in facilitating seamless
interaction between a person and the biometric sensor in
both cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios. Adapted
from [16].
Research problem 2: Designing data-driven tech-
niques for (a) modeling human behavior when interact-
ing with a biometric system, and (b) using these models
to redesign the human-computer interface for optimiz-
ing performance and enhancing usability.
Research problem 3: Developing energy-efficient
multipurpose customizable biometric sensors that can
not only acquire the biometric data of an individual but
also rebuff adversarial attacks such as spoofing.
Research problem 4: Harnessing the principle of ad-
ditive manufacturing for open-source physical produc-
tion of innovative sensors and human-computer inter-
faces.
4. Smartphones and Wearable Devices
The explosive growth in the use of smartphones and
wearable devices, such as smartwatches and activity track-
ers, presents an unprecedented opportunity for biometric re-
searchers [3, 24]. Firstly, these devices store or transmit
personal information (e.g., financial or health data), thereby
requiring an effective mechanism to restrict access to the le-
gitimate owner. Secondly, these devices are outfitted with a
large number of sensors that record various physical (e.g.,
distance walked, posture) and biological (e.g., heart rate,
skin temperature) attributes of an individual; principled
methods are needed to parse through this heterogeneous
data and distill a compact representation that can be used
as the biometric signature of that individual (Figure 3). A
related challenge is to be able to generate a “portable” sig-
nature that can be used across devices belonging to the same
individual.
Research problem 5: Extracting a distinct and
portable “signature” of a subject from the data gener-
ated by the built-in sensors present in smartphones and
wearable devices.
Research problem 6: Designing inexpensive biomet-
ric sensors for integration with smartphones and wear-
able devices.
Research problem 7: Developing computationally
simple methods for active user authentication in
resource-constrained wearable devices that have limited
battery power.
5. Presentation Attack Detection
A biometric system is vulnerable to presentation attacks
where an adversary presents a fake (Figure 4) or altered
(Figure 5) biometric trait to the sensor in order to fool the
system [18]. Such an attack may be used to (a) enroll a
fabricated trait in order to create a virtual identity that can
be shared by a group of individuals; or (b) deliberately ob-
fuscate one’s own trait in order to evade being identified;
or (c) spoof the biometric trait of another person in order
to masquerade as them. A number of hardware-based and
software-based solutions have been developed for presen-
tation attack detection (PAD), especially for the face, fin-
gerprint and iris modalities. However, most of the current
solutions do not generalize well across different sensors and
Figure 3: Smartphones are equipped with a number of built-
in sensors. Data from these non-biometric sensors can be
aggregated to construct a behavioral signature of its owner.
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environments.
The challenge is to develop counter-measures that can
deflect unseen and unknown attacks, i.e., those attacks that
have not been considered as yet, but which the system will
encounter in the future. This is a formidable challenge that
can evolve into a “cat-and-mouse” game between the ad-
versary and the system designer. The advent of 3D printing
and additive manufacturing will facilitate the generation of
sophisticated presentation attack vectors. It is essential for
PAD solutions to keep pace with these advanced technolo-
gies.
Research problem 8: Developing anti-spoofing meth-
ods that can generalize well across different types of at-
tacks, sensors, environments, demographic groups and
datasets.
Research problem 9: Designing presentation attack
detectors for resource-constrained IoT devices such as
smartphones and wearable devices.
Research problem 10: Automating the process of
generating adversarial spoof artifacts for a specific bio-
metric sensor by combining 3D printing technology with
robotic process automation testing.
6. Poor Quality Data
As can be seen in Table 1, state-of-the-art biometric
matchers exhibit very good performance when the quality
of the input data is reasonably good. However, the perfor-
mance sharply degrades when a matcher encounters poor
quality data [2]. Examples of poor quality data include fin-
germarks lifted from a crime scene, audio data recorded
in noisy environment, iris images awash with strong non-
uniform illumination, or partially occluded low-resolution
faces in surveillance videos (Figure 6). Reliably enhanc-
ing such data is a challenging problem since many data en-
hancement algorithms do not explicitly attempt to preserve
Table 1: Current state-of-the-art performance of four biometric modalities. Verification (V) performance is reported using
the False Match Rate (FMR) and False Non-Match Rate (FNMR). Identification (I) performance is reported using the False
Negative Identification Rate (FNIR) and False Positive Identification Rate (FPIR).
Modality Mode Report Template Performance Dataset Size CommentsSize
Face V FRVT 1:1 [11] 1.4 KB FNMR 2.71% @ FMR 0.01% 1K subjects, 100K images “In-the-wild”I FRVT 1:N [10] 2.05 KB FNIR 2.0% @ FPIR 0.1% 485K Probe, 1.6M Gallery Mugshots
Fingerprint V FVC-onGoing
1 5.9 KB FNMR 0.036% @ FMR 0.01% 115,710 comparisons Operational conditions
I FpVTE [31] 6.1 KB FNIR 1.9% @ FPIR 0.1% 30K Probe, 100K Gallery Plain fingerprint
Iris V IREX IX [27] 12.33 KB FNMR of 0.57% @ FMR 0.001% 260,809 subjects, Both-eyes;I 12.33 KB FNIR of 0.67% @ FPIR 0.1% 673,662 samples High-quality
Voice V SRE 2016 [28] not given FNMR of 39% @ FMR 0.01% 201 speakers Multi-lingual
Figure 4: Examples of different types of spoof artifacts for
(a) fingerprint, (b) iris and (c) face.
Figure 5: Examples of altered/obfuscated biometric traits.
(a) A surgically altered fingerprint depicting transplanta-
tion with Z-cut. (b) A face image before and after plastic
surgery.2 (c) Cosmetic contact lenses can obfuscate the un-
derlying iris texture pattern.3
the biometric content of the input data; this can potentially
alter the biometric cue in the data resulting in its inadvertent
match with an incorrect identity. This can have serious con-
sequences in law enforcement applications. Further, when
using poor quality biometric data as evidence in a court-of-
law, it is necessary to first compute its evidential value, i.e.,
its utility for reliably identifying an individual.
Figure 6: Examples of poor quality data: face image of the
Boston bomber captured using a surveillance camera (left)
and a latent fingerprint on the surface of an object (right).
Research problem 11: Developing methods for en-
hancing poor quality data such that the biometric con-
tent is not unduly perturbed.
Research problem 12: Designing robust feature ex-
traction and matching algorithms that can successfully
operate on poor quality data.
Research problem 13: Computing the evidential
value of poor quality biometric data, especially in foren-
sic applications.
7. Data Integrity
The integrity of the raw biometric data (e.g., face im-
age) is of paramount importance, especially when it is used
as evidence in a court of law. However, the raw biometric
data of a person can be maliciously modified for nefarious
purposes. For example, digital images and videos of a per-
son’s face may be subtly modified using an editing tool such
as Adobe Photoshop with the intention of creating a false
match. The problem is compounded when strategically al-
tered images and videos are displayed on the Web, partic-
ularly on image sharing platforms. This leads to a prolif-
eration of doctored images and their duplicates on the Web,
1https://biolab.csr.unibo.it/fvcongoing/
2https://www.cincyfacialplastics.com/
before-and-after/luxe-lift-pictures-5859
3https://hoovervisioncenter.com/2015/10/21/
halloween-hazard-the-dangers-of-cosmetic-contact-lenses/
making it difficult to identify the original (pre-modified) im-
age. Recently, Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)
have been used to synthesize realistic looking images and
videos known as DeepFakes (Figure 7).
When images posted on the Web are used for determin-
ing the identity of a person, an erroneous match due to
perturbations in the images can have serious consequences.
Therefore, it is essential for a biometric system to validate
the integrity of the input digital media prior to processing it
(Figure 8). The principle of digital image forensics [9] can
be used for this purpose.
Research problem 14: Designing algorithms for de-
tecting DeepFakes as well as maliciously modified im-
ages/videos of a person.
Research problem 15: Developing methods to iden-
tify the original unmodified image from a given set of
near-duplicate biometric images and to infer the trail of
photometric and geometric modifications that produced
the other images.
Research problem 16: Designing robust sensor-
fingerprinting algorithms that can link a biometric im-
age to the specific sensor unit that produced it.
Figure 7: Examples of realistic-looking digital face images
generated using GANs. Taken from thispersondoesnotex-
ist.com.
8. Cross-modal Biometrics
Cross-modal matching involves associating the data per-
taining to one biometric modality with that of another
modality. There is limited work on this topic. One appli-
cation where cross-modal association can be beneficial is
in the mapping of genomic data to phenotypic traits [17].
For example, generating the face image of a person from
their DNA sample can be useful in criminal investigations
(Figure 9). Cross-modal matching can also be useful in ap-
plications where a specific biometric trait may not be con-
sistently available. For example, in the case of an indoor
surveillance video, the face image of a subject may not
be available in every frame due to low image-resolution,
4https://www.deeptracelabs.com/
5https://www.buzzfeed.com/jessicamisener/
23-celebrities-before-after-photoshop
6https://web.stanford.edu/˜zollhoef/papers/
CVPR2016_Face2Face/page.html
REAL FAKE
Figure 8: Examples of digitally modified media. Top left:
A GAN-generated face image.4 Top right: Near duplicate
face images of four subjects created using Photoshop.5 Bot-
tom: Rendering of a “fake” video by transferring the facial
expressions of one individual (source) to another individual
(target).6
Original FacePredicted FaceGenomic Data
Figure 9: Illustration of cross-modal biometrics where a
face image is generated from the DNA sample of a subject.
Adapted from Lippert et al. [17].
poor illumination, non-frontal pose or occlusions. However,
the audio of the subject’s voice may be available in such
frames. The ability to associate the voice samples of a sub-
ject with their face images for cross-modal identity match-
ing can be valuable. The matching itself can be accom-
plished by the extraction of common soft biometric cues
from the two modalities (e.g., age, gender, height, weight)
or by modeling the correlation between the morphological
aspects of a subject’s face and the acoustic characteristics of
their voice [21]. Another example of cross-modal matching
would be linking RGB face images in a face database with
near-infrared (NIR) iris images in an iris database [15].
A related problem is heterogeneous matching that in-
volves comparing data originating from two distinctly dif-
ferent sensors but pertaining to the same modality, e.g.,
cross-spectral matching of RGB face images with thermal
face images (Figure 10). While it may not be as challeng-
ing as cross-modal biometrics, it nevertheless is an unsolved
problem notwithstanding the large number of papers on the
topic.
Research problem 17: Developing methods for estab-
lishing the degree of correlation, at the biological level,
between two or more biometric traits.
Research problem 18: Developing techniques to de-
duce phenotypic attributes from genomic data for cross-
modal biometric matching.
Research problem 19: Designing methods for gener-
ating a canonical representation of one biometric trait
from another trait.
Research problem 20: Developing models to assess
the upper bound on the recognition accuracy of cross-
spectral biometric recognition.
Visible Near-Infrared
ThermalVisible
Figure 10: Heterogeneous biometric recognition in the con-
text of face (top) and iris (bottom).
9. Postmortem Biometrics
In some scenarios, it may be necessary to identify a de-
ceased person by comparing their postmortem (PM) bio-
metric data with the corresponding antemortem (AM) data.
For example, police officers have sought to unlock the
smartphone of a deceased suspect by using the suspect’s
postmortem fingerprint.7 Another application is victim
identification using postmortem data in the wake of mass fa-
talities due to tsunamis, terrorist attacks, wars, earthquakes
or nuclear explosions. While dental radiographs have been
traditionally used for postmortem biometric identification
(especially in the context of mass disasters), there is increas-
ing interest in utilizing other biometric modalities, such as
face, fingerprints and iris, for this purpose [30]. However,
postmortem biometric identification is beset with a number
of challenges due to reduced data quality and natural de-
composition of body parts. Furthermore, in many cases, the
feature extraction and matching algorithms developed for
7https://www.livescience.com/
62393-dead-fingerprint-unlock-phone.html
antemortem data may not be able to successfully process
postmortem data. Factors such as cause of death, subject’s
age, environmental conditions, etc., can also impact the bio-
metric utility of certain traits.
Research problem 21: Designing novel quality en-
hancement, segmentation and feature extraction algo-
rithms for processing postmortem biometric data.
Research problem 22: Developing methods to effec-
tively match postmortem data of a subject with the cor-
responding antemortem data.
Research problem 23: Modeling the temporal degra-
dation in postmortem biometric data and determining
the factors that impact the biometric utility of post-
mortem data.
Research problem 24: Investigating the feasibility of
using postmortem biometric traits to launch a presenta-
tion attack against a biometric system.
10. Soft Biometrics
While biometric data is typically used for recognizing
an individual, it is possible to deduce or extract additional
information, such as age, gender, ethnicity, height, weight,
hair color, eye color, clothing style, tattoos, etc., from the
same data [6]. These attributes, sometimes referred to as
soft biometric attributes, can be used independently or in
conjunction with primary biometric traits to improve the
recognition accuracy of a biometric system. Further, they
provide a human-interpretable description of the underly-
ing biometric data (e.g., “Young Asian Male” or “Iris With a
Dilated Pupil”). They can also be used to restrict the search
space in a gallery database to only those identities that share
similar soft biometric attributes as the input probe data. In
spite of their potential benefits, there are a number of open
research problems in this area.
Research problem 25: Designing methods to deduce
soft biometric information from poor quality biometric
data.
Research problem 26: Extracting soft biometric in-
formation from behavioral traits.
Research problem 27: Estimating upper bounds on
the uniqueness and persistence of soft biometric at-
tributes.
11. Personal Privacy
As stated in the previous section, recent advances in ma-
chine learning has made it possible to extract ancillary in-
formation, such as a person’s age, gender, ancestral origin
and health, from their biometric data using sophisticated
classifiers [6]. The possibility of eliciting genetic informa-
tion from facial images has also been studied [19]. When
such information is extracted without the subject’s consent,
then issues of function creep and privacy infringement are
Figure 11: Illustration of controllable biometric privacy,
where users can determine which information to keep and
which to conceal.
brought to the fore. Similarly, when biometric data is used
to unmask the identity of a person by linking information
from seemingly disparate sources, it can represent a pri-
vacy breach. For example, matching an unidentified face
image from a pseudonymized dating website with an iden-
tified face image in a social network website can expose
sensitive details about a person through data accretion [1].
Recent research has explored the notion of controllable
privacy [29] where specific ancillary cues are suppressed in
the raw image (Figure 11). For example, semi-adversarial
neural networks have been designed to remove gender cues
from a face image, through a series of perturbations, such
that the performance of automated gender classifiers is
confounded but the performance of face matchers is re-
tained [20]. Introduction of the EU General Data Protec-
tion Regulation (GDPR) has reinforced the importance of
designing privacy-preserving methods in the context of bio-
metric systems.
Research problem 28: Designing methods for im-
parting controllable and quantifiable soft-biometric pri-
vacy to biometric data without compromising recogni-
tion accuracy.
12. Biases in Biometrics
Biometric systems, especially those based on face recog-
nition, have exhibited demographic bias in which certain
population groups have experienced significantly higher er-
ror rates than others. For example, face detection meth-
ods have been observed to fail more often on subjects with
darker skin-tone than those with lighter skin-tone [5]. In
another study, researchers found that automated face recog-
nition systems developed in Western countries performed
better on Caucasian faces than East Asian faces and, con-
versely, automated face recognition systems developed in
East Asian countries performed better on East Asian faces
than Caucasian faces [26]. While such biases could be at-
tributed to the lack of sufficiently diverse training data, it
nevertheless brings into question the fairness and integrity
of AI-based systems. Indeed, data-driven approaches seem
to be vulnerable to such biases and it remains to be seen
how this can be mitigated in the context of biometric sys-
tems that are increasingly being deployed in heterogeneous
populations worldwide (Figure 12).
Figure 12: It is essential for biometric systems to be unbi-
ased and perform well across diverse demographic groups
(images are from the CelebA dataset).
Research problem 29: Determining the underlying
cause for race and gender bias in biometrics and to de-
sign methods that alleviate this problem.
Research problem 30: Assembling large multimodal
biometric datasets exhibiting demographic diversity in
order to effectively train biometric matchers.
13. Other Research Problems
Besides the aforementioned topics, there are a number of
other active research problems in the field. These include:
(a) designing novel sensors for acquiring biometric data
from infants and toddlers; (b) performing biometric recog-
nition based on bacterial colonies on the human skin; (c)
reliable human recognition from low-quality contaminated
DNA samples; (d) homomorphic encryption methods for
biometric template security; (e) integration of biometrics
in the blockchain protocol for implementing self-sovereign
identity; (f) information fusion techniques for combining
biometrics with demographic data, quality measures, social
information, and presentation attack detectors; (g) studying
the impact of age and disease on the performance of individ-
ual biometric traits; (h) discovering and mitigating the im-
pact of adversarial samples that can destabilize Deep Learn-
ing based biometric matchers; (i) harnessing explainable AI
techniques for semantically interpreting trained neural net-
work models; and (j) models for predicting biometric per-
formance of large-scale systems having billions of identi-
ties.
14. Summary
Biometrics is a fascinating pattern recognition problem
with several societal benefits [25]. The past decade has seen
a surge in the use of biometric technology for diverse appli-
cations. Advancements in other domains have opened up
new opportunities for biometric researchers. At the same
time, a number of fundamental issues remain unsolved in
the field even after several years [12]. In this paper, we
highlighted some of the research opportunities in biometrics
and discussed its intersection with adjacent fields including
forensics, genomics, anthropology and psychology.
The definition of identity itself is continually evolv-
ing [4]. In an increasingly connected world,8 the distinction
between social identity, online identity and device identity
has blurred. Individuals are increasingly leaving their “dig-
ital fingerprints” on the Web and in personal electronic de-
vices such as smartphones and wearables. This, coupled
with the widespread availability of inexpensive digital sen-
sors and storage units, has led to the realization of exo-
self, where the physical identity of a person overlaps sig-
nificantly with their digital and device identities. This has
further enhanced the scope of biometrics thereby bringing
together evidence at the molecular level, biological level,
behavioral level and digital level for human recognition.
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